# **Seminar**Understanding Worldwide Private Information Collection on Android

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Possible Solutions



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#### About the Research

Private Information Collection on Android

#### **Dataset**

**21** Months between 2018 – 2019

6 Billion Record

17.3 Million devices in 201 Countries and Regions

**2.13** Million Apps (6.5 Million SHA2s)

#### **Information Collection**

Mobile app activity data collect from mobile security product and measure in several steps.




Fig. 1: Workflow of our measurement study.



**About Privacy Information Collection on Android** 


### **Types of Private Information**

Private Information Collection on Android

 Account Info Contact Info

Call/SMS Log

Calendar Info



 Running App Browser Info

#### **Pervasiveness of Private Information Collection**

Private Information Collection on Android

Android Devices

87.2%

Send to 5 or more domains

United State collect

62%


Private information in the research

Over 156K APPs Collect at least 5 unique categories of private information

13M Devices These apps cover 13 million devices which cover 74.9% of the dataset

Over 10K Domain There are 10,736 domains belong to 9,593 organisations

# Top 20 Private Information Collection Domain Private Information Collection on Android



#### Purpose

Most of the domains (15/20) are use for advertising purpose

#### Data Interest

On average, a domain collect over 8 types of private information, like call/SMS log, identity info, location info and social network info

#### Geography

Certain PIC domains have a high reginal app presence.

# PIC Domain Summary Private Information Collection on Android

- Some of the actors who managed to get their libraries installed in many apps failed to have many users running them.
- Certain PIC domains consistently collect multiple types of private information from the devices
- Device penetration could be a better way to analyse than app presence
- Different regional domains targeting users in different continents, and collecting different types of private information.

#### **Private Information Destinations**

Private Information Collection on Android

- United State and China are the largest two countries hosting the PIC domains.
- Other countries host significantly fewer PIC domains
- There are also 6.4% of the domain could not be recognised the destination





Fig. 7: Global top 20 countries ranked by the number of PIC domains hosted.

#### **Private Information Destinations**


Private Information Collection on Android


- United State and China are the largest two countries hosting the PIC domains.
- PIC domains hosted in the United States collect 62% of global private information flows.
- PIC domains hosted in the United States dominate the private information collection in the EU
- India generate 40% of data but only 1.28% terminating at the same country



#### **Data Processors & Controllers**

Private Information Collection on Android





Global top 25 data controllers ranked by the fraction of devices they collect private information from.

These 25 data controllers collect private information from a total of 13.9M devices covering 80.2% of all devices used in this study.



**Possible Solution** 



#### Authority



• EU announced GDPR

 Policymakers need further regulate how private information is used by and shared among the companies and

Accountability

Protect Private
Information

End-User





#### Android



- Since Android API 23, dangerous permissions added that request permission when app access restricted data
- Android API 29 Add further security measures to protect privacy



Q&A

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## Reference

Shen, Yun, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, and Gianluca Stringhini, Understanding Worldwide Private Information Collection on Android, In Proceedings of Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium, 2021. https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ndss2021\_3B-3\_24076\_paper.pdf