

iOS ENCRYPTION

Lecture 19b

COMPSCI 702
Security for Smart-Devices

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DATA PROTECTION



Do we need to protect data stored on the device?


WHY DATA PROTECTION



- An increased risk of sensitive data compromise through
 - A lost device
 - A stolen device
- Data protection features safeguard sensitive data
- How can we protect data on the device?

ATTEMPT 1: PROTECTION USING PASSCODE

- Encrypt each file using a passcode




- Main issues
 - Brute-forcing
 - Changing a passcode will require re-encryption of file content using a new passcode

HARDENING BRUTE-FORCING



- Can we achieve better security using passcodes?
- Yes, we can stretch passcodes using KDF (Key Derivation Function)
 - Derive a secret key from the passcode


PBKDF2



- A Password-Based Key Derivation Function
- $DK = \text{PBKDF2}(\text{password}, \text{salt}, \text{count}, \text{klen})$
 - *password* is the master password from which a derived key is generated
 - *salt* is a random sequence of bits
 - *count* represents number of iterations
 - *klen* is the desired length of the derived key
 - *DK* denotes the desired key
- It is known as a key stretching function
- The added computational work makes password cracking much more difficult
- Using PBKDF2, we can generate a **passcode key** from the passcode

ATTEMPT 2: PROTECTION USING PASSCODE KEY

- Encrypt each file using the passcode key



- Main issues
 - Brute-forcing is still possible
 - Changing the passcode will require re-encryption of file contents using the new passcode key

ATTEMPT 3: LAYERED PROTECTION

- Encrypt each file using a file key
- Encrypt each file key using the passcode key



- Changing a passcode will just require re-encryption of the file key using the new passcode key
- Now, the issue is the passcode guessing attack!

PASSCODE GUESSING (iPHONE 4)

- 9.18 guesses per second

Passcode Length	Complexity	Worst Case Time
4	Numeric	18 minutes
4	Alphanumeric	51 hours
6	Alphanumeric	8 years
8	Alphanumeric	13 thousand years
8	Alphanumeric, Complex	2 million years

Source:
"iOS Hacker's
Handbook"

- Alphanumeric: 10 digits and both upper and lower-case letters
- Alphanumeric, complex: adds 35 symbols


UID AND GID



- UID key is unique to the device
 - An AES 256-bit hardware key
 - Inside the cryptographic accelerator
 - Cannot access it through software
 - This encrypts a static string to produce the **device key**
 - Neither recorded by Apple nor by any of its suppliers
- There is also a GID key unique to the device model
 - Used to decrypt iOS firmware images

iOS FILE DATA PROTECTION


- A file key is encrypted using a class key
- Different class keys represent circumstances under which files should be accessed
- Device key and passcode key are used to protect class keys



FILE PROTECTION CLASSES

Protection Class	Description
NSFileProtection Complete	The file can be accessed only when the device is unlocked – the class key is removed 10s after a device gets locked either automatically or manually (useful for, e.g., mobile banking)
NSFileProtection Complete Unless Open	The file can be opened when the device is unlocked – once opened, it could be accessed afterwards, even if the device gets locked (useful for, e.g., email while the device is locked)
NSFileProtection Complete Until First User Authentication	The file is protected unless the device is booted and the user enters the passcode for the first time (useful for, e.g., SIM contacts)
NSFileProtection None	The file is not protected and it can be accessed at any time (useful for things like background wallpaper)

THE KEY HIERARCHY



Source: "iOS Hacker's Handbook"

TO BE CONTINUED



- See the next lecture



Questions?

Thanks for your attention!