- Has Neumann applied Turing theoretical ideas in designing the IAS
Machine?
During 1936 through 1938 Alan Turing was a visitor at the Institute for
Advanced Studies and completed a Ph.D. dissertation under von Neumann's
supervision. This visit occurred shortly after Turing's publication of his
1934 paper "On Computable Numbers with an Application to the
Entscheidungs-problem" which involved the concepts of logical design and
the universal machine. It must be concluded that von Neumann knew of
Turing's ideas, though whether he applied them to the design of the IAS
Machine ten years later is questionable.
Suggested References
-
W.F. Aspray. From Mathematical Constructivity to Computer Science: Alan
Turing, John von Neumann, and the Origins of Computer Science in
Mathematical Logic, 1980. Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Univ. of
Wisconsin, Madison WI.
-
W.F. Aspray. The mathematical reception of the modern computer: John von
Neumann and the Institute for Advanced Study computer, in Phillips, Esther
R. (ed), Studies in the History of Mathematics, Vol. 26, MAA, Washington
DC,1987, pp. 166-194.
-
J. Bigelow. Computer development at the Institute for Advanced Study, in
Metropolis, N., J. Howlett, and Gian-Carlo Rota. 1980. A History of
Computing in the Twentieth Century, Academic Press, Inc., New York, 1980,
pp. 291-310.
-
H.H. Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, Princeton Univ.
Press, Princeton NJ,1972.
-
D. Ritchie. The Computer Pioneers, Simon & Shuster, Inc., New York, 1986.
Chapter 9.
-
N. Stern. From ENIAC to UNIVAC: An Appraisal of the Eckert-Mauchly
Computers, Digital Press, Bedford MA, 1981.
-
N. Stern. Computing, 1944-46, Ann. Hist. Comp., Vol. 2, No. 4, 1980,
pp. 349-362.
-
A.H. Taub (ed). John von Neumann: Collected Works, 1903-1957, 6 Vols.,
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1961-63.
- The first
papers in algorithmic information theory
There are a few misconceptions and inexactities about priorities in
algorithmic information theory (especially related to the first
papers) which are widely repeated...
Suggested References
-
C. Calude. Information and Randomness --- An Algorithmic Perspective,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1994.
- G. J. Chaitin. Information, Randomness and Incompleteness,
Papers on Algorithmic Information Theory,
World Scientific, Singapore, 1987. (2nd ed., 1990)
- G. J. Chaitin. Information-Theoretic Incompleteness,
World Scientific, Singapore, 1992.
- M. Li, P. M. Vitanyi. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and
Its Applications, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1993.
- A. N. Kolmogorov. Three approaches for defining the concept of
``information quantity", Problems Inform. Transmission 1(1965), 3-11.
- G. Markowsky. Introduction to algorithmic information theory,
J. UCS 5(1996), 245-269.
- R.J. Solomonoff. The discovery of algorithmic probability: A guide
for the programming of true creativity, in P. Vitanyi (ed.).
Computational learning theory. Proceedings of the Second European Conference
(EuroCOLT '95), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 904, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1995, 1-23.
- Occam's razor principle
Occam's razor is a logical principle attributed to the mediaeval philosopher
William of Occam (or Ockham). The principle, often called the
principle of parsimony, states that "one should not increase,
beyond what is necessary, the number of entities
required to explain anything". In any given model, Occam's
razor recommends to "cut away" those concepts, variables or constructs that
are not really needed to explain the phenomenon. So,
the model will become much easier, and there is less chance of introducing
inconsistencies, ambiguities and redundancies.
Suggested References
- G. J. Chaitin. Information, Randomness and Incompleteness,
Papers on Algorithmic Information Theory,
World Scientific, Singapore, 1987. (2nd ed., 1990)
- G. J. Chaitin. Information-Theoretic Incompleteness,
World Scientific, Singapore, 1992.
-
J. Horgan. The End of Science, Addison-Wesley, New York, 1996. Chapters
3, 9.
- The
Scientific Method
- Occam's razor in
PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA WEB
- Does Goedel's incompleteness theorem apply to physics?
Since all physical laws are mathematical, and mathematics is incomplete
(Goedel) it is plausible that physics is incomplete and therefore
open-ended. Is this "hope" (expressed by Penrose and many others) true?
Suggested References
-
J. Cornwell (ed.). Nature's Imagination, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 11.
-
J. Horgan. The End of Science, Addison-Wesley, New York, 1996. Chapters
3, 9, 10.
-
D. McCullough. "Can humans escape Goedel?",
PSYCHE 2, 4 (1995).
-
R. Penrose. Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press, 1994.
-
R. Penrose. "Beyond the doubting of a shadow",
PSYCHE 2, 23 (1996).