Great! I enjoyed enormously reading the book, which, I believe, will remain an important resource for understanding not only Gšdel's life and philosophy, but also the meaning of his incompleteness theorems, for beginning and seasoned readers alike. I particularly like the explanations of the affinity between Gšdel and Einstein, and the role played by their philosophical convictions for their technical works. Local comments. I use the notation: p. a^b means page a, line b from top, p. a_b means page a, line b from bottom. a) p 78^{16}: empricial should perhaps be empirical b) p. 92^{16}: "So an inconsistent system is worthless as a tool of proof." Not every inconsistent system is capable of proving each statement in the system. Inconsistent mathematics is the study of the mathematical theories that result when classical mathematical axioms are asserted within the framework of a (non-classical) logic which can tolerate some degree of inconsistency, for example, the presence of a "local/benign" contradiction (one which doesn't turn every sentence into a theorem). For more information see: http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/mathematics-inconsistent/ Ch. Mortensen. Inconsistent Mathematics, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1995. c) p. 119^9, 119^{13}, 269^7, 276_{11}. 276_{9}. 279_{8}: Kreisl should be Kreisel. I refer to the book P. Odifreddi (ed.). "Kreiseliana", AK Peters, MA 1996 for more on G. Kreisel fascinating life and work. d) p. 127^1: "arithmetic, the simplest branch of all mathematics." Many mathematicians would disagree with this statement: arithmetic is often portrayed as simple, but in fact it's deep and exceptionally difficult. Fermat and Goldbach conjectures illustrate this idea quite convincingly. It is often said that Ê"Mathematics is Queen of the Sciences and Arithmetic the Queen of Mathematics." e) p. 194^{2,3}: "His [Wittgenstein] aim, as he said, was to bypass Gšdel's proof." Wittgenstein would have had a better line of attack by examining the "reasonableness" of the hypothesis that the formal axiomatic system is fixed. Actually, formal axiomatic systems evolve in a similar manner to the laws of physics (which evolve at least with the change of the states of the universe). Perhaps one could argue that it is as unreasonable to hope that mathematics is complete as it is to believe in a theory of everything in physics. f) p. 195, footnote 9: Kline should be ÊKleene. The logician Stephen C. Kleene, http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/ Kleene.html, is different from Morris Kline, the author of the book "Mathematics, the Loss of Certainty", Oxford University Press, 1980. g) ÊThe main stream in mathematical logic (whatever its meaning) seems to "like" Gšdel's completeness theorem much more than Gšdel's incompleteness theorem. For Martin Davis, http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/1999-February/002573.html it is "unquestionably true" that incompleteness has very little impact on the bulk of mathematical research. Not so: Gšdel's incompleteness theorems opened whole new branches in mathematical logic (cf., for example, p. 251_4). Furthermore, one might think that these abstract things interest only philosophers. See Wolfram's talk "The Foundations of Mathematics and Mathematica" http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/talks/IMS/imstalk.html for an instance of their "practicality". Along the same line, one might think that by now we know everything about incompleteness. Not really! My favourite questions which still need answers are: "which statements of a given formal axiomatic system are likely to be unprovable?" and "how artificial is the incompleteness phenomenon?". C.S. Calude Review of R. Goldstein. Incompleteness. The Proof and Paradox of Kurt G\" odel, Atlas Books, New York, 2005}, Amazon, http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A3A7QOZ8WMS6LW/ref=cm\_cr\_auth/103-5969736-5323808?\%} {\tt 5Fencoding=UTF8